July 8, 2011
“A verge is a place of encounter between something and something else.”
Daniel J. Boorstin
The Fertile Verge: Creativity in the United States
1980
Dear Friends,
Like most metaphors that infiltrate the foreign policy and national security lexicon, “The Arab Spring” has outlived its brief and tenuous relevance.
The metaphor was intended to connote three features of what appeared to be a chain reaction of unfolding revolutions and realignments, beginning in Tunisia, then Egypt, and beyond: (a) their refreshing, reanimating character (b) their spontaneity and speed; and (c) their regional and ethnic dimensions.
And though loathe being a killjoy, TMR holds that Arab Spring is misleading on all three counts. So, let’s have a more in-depth look.
In a recently published paper for the Carnegie Endowment, the eminent diplomat-scholar, Jordan’s former Foreign Minister, Marwan Muasher, articulated the reality as a seasoned observer from the region sees it:
“We are going to experience many seasons — springs, summers, falls and winters. The Arab Awakening is going to be measured in decades, not months or years.”
Add to that, the Council on Foreign Relations CEO, Richard Haass made this observation in the July 6th edition of the Financial Times:
“Take all this together, and you see a series of developments that are beginning to produce a region that is less tolerant, less prosperous, and less stable that what existed. To be sure, the authoritarian old guard that still dominates much of the Middle East could yet be forced or eased out and replaced with something relatively democratic and open. Unfortunately, the odds now seem against this happening.”
We might say that it’s a little less Arab Spring and touch more Gilbert and Sullivan:
Things are seldom what they seem,
Skim milk masquerades as cream;
Highlows pass as patent leathers;
Jackdaws strut in peacock's feathers.
Very true,
So they do.
Black sheep dwell in every fold;
All that glitters is not gold;
Storks turn out to be but logs;
Bulls are but inflated frogs.
So they be,
Frequentlee.
What, then, can we say about the changes that have been roiling the nation-states of the Middle East and Northern Africa for these past six months? And what ignited it all?
The distinguished French scholar, Jean-Pierre Filiu, author of the recently published book, “Apocalypse in Islam,” offered this thought recently to a group of Middle East specialists assembled by the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution:
“The Berlin Wall of the Arab world was fear.”
And so when 26-year old Mohammed Bouazizi set himself aflame in mid-December 2010, he kindled an uprising that would decapitate the 23-year rule of President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali within less than a month.
Within days, the fever spread to Egypt where unprecedented numbers of resolute Egyptians would encamp in Tahrir Square forcing the final act of President Hosni Mubarak’s three-decade long dictatorial rule.
Within a matter of weeks, it seemed as though the decades of ‘fear of fear’ that had permeated the politics of the region had ended abruptly -- dominoes were falling swiftly, perhaps even sequentially?
And then came Bahrain, Libya, Yemen, and Syria – the first, a rebellion successfully quashed, thanks to a Saudi intervention; and the second, third, and fourth still in varying stages of play.
Thus, the early euphoria of an “Arab Spring” yielded to more subdued and somber assessments about regional prospects for social, political, and economic reform and development, which is a predictable outcome of such moments in history.
Of course, there are reasons to be guardedly optimistic about the longer-term prospects, just as there is basis for intermediate anxiety to substantiate the observation made by British historian A.J.P. Taylor about the European revolutions of 1848:
"History reached its turning point, and failed to turn.”
It is for these reasons that TMR prefers the term, “The Arab Verge” – a time and a place of encounter between something and something else.
Some things have turned; others are still turning, while much remains unclear and indeterminate. And, of course, there is the Russian model to remind us that few things in political life are immutable.
However, informed assessments require the passage of time and a broadening of the geopolitical lens. Because while “What happens in Vegas stays in Vegas,” what happens in the lands between the Mediterranean and the East China Sea or from the Bay of Bengal to the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea is a matter of considerable complexity and with permutations and combinations that keep the best think tanks around the globe operating 24/7.
And on that point, the Brookings’ Saban Center hosted a international teleconference and colloquium last week at both its Washington DC and Doha, Qatar offices -- led by its Director, Kenneth M. Pollack and a pair of first-rate scholars -- to focus on the pivotal question of how the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia may deal with the new and emerging political calculus in the region and beyond. The session operated under Chatham House Rules, which dictates that participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speakers, nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.
Why Saudi Arabia?
First, they are the principal drivers of global oil markets.
Second, they are a major force in the politics of the Arab Middle East.
Third, they are home to the two most holy sites in Islam.
Fourth, they are deeply displeased with the Obama Administration’s ‘desertion’ of President Hosni Mubarak and the shift to allying with the people of Tahrir Square.
Fifth, they provided the resources to curb the nascent rebellion in Bahrain, a fully transparent expression of their views about maintaining the regional status quo.
Sixth, they were vehemently opposed to the Iraq War, primarily because it would upset the regional status quo – removing a Sunni dictator (Saddam Hussein) and, thus, providing a power vacuum for Shia Iran.
Seventh, the Kingdom’s discontent with U. S. policy in the region has led them to forge a stronger alliance with China – aka, ‘playing the China card.’
Likewise, the Pakistanis have been focusing attention on Beijng in response to the deteriorating relationship with the U.S., recently exacerbated by the Abbottabad bin Laden compound raid and ensuing incidents that point to high level collusion between their military and intelligence organizations and the most active terrorist groups.
If both countries continue to engage in a “diversifying alliances” strategy, America’s influence and leverage throughout these regions would be diminished, while the Chinese would gain traction.
And while considering these regional scenarios, factor in the Republic of Turkey, an increasingly active and significant player in the regional dynamic and the global order – a democratic, predominantly Muslim, independent-minded, nation-state that has its own ambitious foreign policy agenda, which features an ‘eastward tilt’ and alliances with authoritarian regimes.
OK. Enough geopolitics for one day.
It boils down to three points:
First, the Arab Spring has sprung, and we’ll be at this for many, many, many seasons.
Second, the reform process in Arab countries is uncertain, at best, and potentially a windfall for terrorist organizations that thrive in ‘governless’ territories.
Third, when change comes to a country as small as Yemen or a region as consequential as the Middle East or South Asia, the momentum and reach are unpredictable, except that it will almost certainly create change in the global order – much like the “butterfly effect” that describes how tiny variations can affect giant systems.
And on this latter point, the phenomenon was described elegantly more than a century-and-a-half ago by the legendary naturalist and Sierra Club founder, John Muir, in his book, “My First Summer in the Sierra:”
“When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the universe.”
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